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ABSTRACT
Intersex conditions are variations in in utero reproductive 
development that often result in the child developing ambiguous 
genitalia. Currently, the dominant treatment method for children 
born with intersex conditions is surgical reconstruction of the child’s 
genitalia. Surgical assignment in infancy can result in a host of 
medical and psychological problems. What parents believe to be a 
one-time surgery that will correct the child’s condition permanently 
often leads to many surgeries throughout puberty and adulthood in 
an attempt to correct unsuccessful infant surgeries. Most 
importantly, in the majority of cases, surgery is entirely cosmetic, 
serving no legitimate medical purpose.  
Parents are legally permitted to consent to their child’s genital 
surgery in infancy. Children born with intersex conditions must live 
with the results of this highly invasive, irreversible surgery for their 
entire lives, despite having been deprived of the opportunity to grant 
informed consent to the procedure. The law presumes that parents 
act in the best interest of their children, and, as a result, parents are 
afforded a great deal of latitude in making medical decisions for 
their children. Genital surgery has strong implications for the 
infant’s privacy rights, particularly regarding reproduction and 
sexual health, which support state intervention to prevent purely 
cosmetic surgeries. 
In order to protect children born with intersex conditions, the 
law must strike a careful balance between individuals’ fundamental 
right to parent their children and the states’ right to protect the 
health and welfare of minors. Protecting intersex children from 
cosmetic, life-altering surgery is a compelling state interest that 
would justify acting as parens patriae to prevent parents from 
consenting to the surgery on their children’s behalf. The state would 
serve the best interests of the child by mandating that parents attend 
counseling with an individual educated about intersex conditions 
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and requiring an independent decisionmaker to approve any 
surgeries requested by the parents. While the state cannot entirely 
usurp parental power, careful regulation of intersex surgeries would 
balance the states’ interest in protecting the welfare of the child and 
the parents’ interest in their family autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
When Tony Briffa was born, doctors were not sure what to tell 
his parents.1 After childbirth, most doctors immediately announce 
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whether the baby is a boy or a girl; gender is also often the first 
question people will ask when a friend or family member has a new 
baby.2 However, Briffa was born with a condition called Partial 
Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (PAIS),3 which caused his 
genitalia to appear too ambiguous for doctors to immediately discern 
his sex.4 Like many intersex children, Briffa underwent genital 
surgery in infancy, and doctors reconstructed his genitalia and 
removed his testes so that he would appear biologically female.5
Briffa was too young to know what was happening to his body and 
certainly too young to consent to such a drastic procedure.6 As he 
explains, “I spent a lot of time in hospitals being examined and 
having tests. I was told not to talk about it because it was a secret. 
Over time, I learned I couldn’t have children and I’d never get 
periods. I was confused; I felt like a freak.”7
Briffa learned about his PAIS and the subsequent surgery in 
early adulthood, and after several years of experimentation and 
hormone treatments, he now identifies as both male and female.8
Briffa’s story reached an eventual happy ending, but many other 
adults who underwent similar surgery in infancy report a sense of 
confusion as to their gender and sexual orientation as they entered 
puberty and early childhood.9 For some, the internal discord was 
compounded by parents and doctors who refused to discuss, or even 
acknowledge, their condition.10
Physicians often recommend to parents of intersex children that 
the parent have the child’s genitalia surgically “corrected” in 
infancy.11 Surgery alleviates the societal discomfort associated with 
                                                                                                               
1. Proud Intersex Person Tony Briffa Tells Story of Self Discovery,
HERALD SUN (Sept. 7, 2014, 8:27 PM) [hereinafter Tony Briffa], http://www. 
heraldsun.com.au/lifestyle/proud-intersex-person-tony-briffa-tells-story-of-self-
discovery/story-fnixw28f-1227051164954?nk=abab93b97a697c29366d6e801e0d34e5. 
2. See ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 45 (2000). 
3. See infra Part I. 
4. Tony Briffa, supra note 1. 
5. Id. 
6. Id.  
7. Id. 
8. About Tony . . . , TONY BRIFFA, http://briffa.org/about (last visited Feb. 
8, 2016). He was also the first openly intersexual mayor in world, serving as mayor 
to the town of Hobsons Bay, just outside of Melbourne, Australia, from 2011 to 
2012. Id. 
9. See SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXED 1-4 (1990). 
10. Id.
11. Id. at 23.
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intersex conditions by promoting the culturally accepted “gender 
binary,” which mandates that an individual will be either masculine 
or feminine, but nothing in between.12 The suggestion is offered as a 
way to protect the child from growing up feeling different, to prevent 
the child from being confused about his or her gender, and to 
alleviate the social anxiety and stress that comes with explaining that 
one’s child has an intersex condition.13 While intersex activists14 and 
some physicians15 have begun to question the concealment-centered 
model for intersex treatment, the prevailing standard of care still 
involves cosmetic surgery16 to place intersex infants neatly within the 
gender binary.17
Because gender is a fundamental aspect of one’s identity and 
sense of self,18 surgery without the child’s informed consent raises 
strong concerns about the child’s Fourteenth Amendment privacy 
rights.19 Arguably, there is little that is more private than a person’s 
biological sex and gender identity. States can combat the harmful, 
life-long effects of these genital surgeries by invoking the parens 
patriae, or “parent of the country,” doctrine to mandate counseling 
and an official judgment that the surgery would be in the child’s best 
12. Julie Tilsen, David Nylund & Lorraine Grieves, The Gender Binary:
Theory and Lived Experience, INT’L J. NARRATIVE THERAPY & COMMUNITY WORK
47, 48 (2007) (“The gender binary is a discourse which demands compulsory 
conformity to individual gender performances of either male or female (terms which 
within the gender binary are supposedly mutually exclusive).”). Within the gender 
binary is the inherent assumption that an individual’s gender corresponds to the 
individual’s biological sex. Id.
13. Id.
14. ALICE DREGER, INTERSEX SOC’Y OF N. AM., SHIFTING THE PARADIGM OF 
INTERSEX TREATMENT 1 (n.d.), www.isna.org/pdf/compare.pdf. 
15. Peter A. Lee et al., Consensus Statement on Management of Intersex
Disorders, 118 PEDIATRICS e488, e490 (2006). 
16. Ryan L. White, Preferred Private Parts: Importing Intersex Autonomy
for M.C. v. Aaronson, 37 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 777, 788-89 (2014). There are some 
intersex conditions that do require immediate surgery for the sake of the child’s 
health. See DREGER, supra note 14. The focus of this Note is purely on those 
surgeries that are performed for cosmetic reasons rather than medical ones. 
17. See KESSLER, supra note 9, at 14. “Gender” refers to the amalgam of
cultural and social constructions and expectations associated with biological sex—
simply, it represents the common conception of “masculine” and “feminine” 
behavior, dress, parlance, and occupation, among other things. Myra J. Hird, 
Gender’s Nature: Intersexuality, Transsexualism and the ‘Sex’/’Gender’ Binary, 1 
FEMINIST THEORY 347, 348 (2000).
18. See Tilsen, Nylund & Grieves, supra note 12, at 48.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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interest, medically and otherwise, before the surgery can proceed.20
By taking affirmative action to prevent these surgeries from taking 
place when they are medically unnecessary, the state can protect 
children with intersex conditions and ensure that private aspects of 
their identities and personhood are not determined by doctors and 
patients in infancy.21 Thus, the substantive due process right to 
privacy should serve as a basis for granting intersex children the 
right to informed consent—including postponing any surgery until 
the child is old enough to meaningfully participate in the decision—
to genital surgery in cases in which surgery is purely cosmetic.  
Part I of this Note explains some of the conditions that most 
commonly lead to cosmetic surgery in infancy and gives a history of 
intersex treatments in the United States.22 This history begins with an 
explanation of the concealment-centered approach, including its 
controversial genesis, and details newer proposed models for 
treatment.23 Part II focuses on the right to privacy, particularly on 
how privacy rights have been used in abortion law pertaining to 
minors.24 Part III discusses parents’ rights to make medical decisions 
for their children and discusses how parental rights and the state’s 
parens patriae rights can intersect and conflict.25 Part IV sets forth a 
model for how the state can intervene as parens patriae to prevent 
unconsented-to genital surgeries and argues that the right to privacy 
in abortion law is precedent for the assertion that minors are entitled 
to make decisions concerning their future reproductive and sexual 
health.26
I. BIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF INTERSEX CONDITIONS
Intersex case management has a controversial history: The 
traditional treatment used surgery and secrecy to prevent the child 
from learning about his or her condition, often well into adulthood.27
This treatment model was developed by John Money in a famous 
20. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
(1982). 
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part I.
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. Alice Domurat Dreger, A History of Intersex: From the Age of Gonads
to the Age of Consent, in INTERSEX IN THE AGE OF ETHICS 5, 16-17 (Alice Domurat 
Dreger ed., 1999). 
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experimental case study involving twin boys, neither of whom was 
born with an intersex condition.28 Since the early 1990s, intersex 
activists have been drawing attention to the problems with the 
surgical intervention model, and one such group, the Intersex Society 
of North America (ISNA),29 has instead developed a patient-centered 
model for intersex case management.30 A task force of medical 
professionals developed another treatment model in 2006 advocating 
a multidisciplinary approach that endorses surgery only in severe 
cases.31 However, the surgical and concealment model remains the 
most common method of treating intersex conditions in children.32
A. Biology Behind Intersex Conditions 
Intersex conditions, also known as Disorders of Sexual 
Development (DSDs), are biological variations in sexual 
development that result in primary, and sometimes secondary, sexual 
characteristics that cannot be categorized within the typical gender 
binary.33 In many cases, children born with intersex conditions have 
ambiguous external genitalia—that is, the size of the genitalia will 
not fall within the “acceptable” range for the length of a newborn’s 
penis or clitoris.34 When the infant’s genitals are considered 
medically unacceptable, the doctor will often seek the parent’s 
consent to perform genital surgery and assign the newborn to a 
specific sex.35 While the exact figure is unknown, doctors estimate 
that between 1 in 1,500 and 1 in 2,000 children are born with an 
intersex condition.36
28. JENNIFER GERMON, GENDER: A GENEALOGY OF AN IDEA 36 (2009).
29. ISNA, http://www.isna.org/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2016).
30. See DREGER, supra note 14, at 1.
31. See Lee et al., supra note 15, at e490-91.
32. See White, supra note 16, at 788.
33. JULIE A. GREENBERG, INTERSEXUALITY AND THE LAW: WHY SEX
MATTERS 1 (2012). These conditions can arise from variations in chromosomes, 
gonadal development, and hormone levels during in utero development. Id. at 13.  
34. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 2, at 58. Fausto-Sterling published a
“Phall-O-Metrics” diagram that illustrates how this determination is typically made. 
Id. at 59. The average clitoris length at birth is approximately 0.85 centimeters or 
shorter, and the average penis length at birth is between approximately 2.5 and 4.5 
centimeters. Id. Anything that falls between 0.85 centimeters and 2.5 centimeters is 
medically “unacceptable,” calling for corrective surgery. Id.
35. See id. at 58. In practice, doctors are more likely to assign an infant
female than male, as it is simply easier to construct female genitals. Id. at 59. 
36. How Common Is Intersex?, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM., http://www.isna.
org/faq/frequency (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
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Two intersex conditions that are often treated with genital 
surgery are Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) and Androgen 
Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS).37 In cases of CAH, a female fetus with 
XX chromosomes is exposed to high levels of adrenal androgens 
during development, resulting in masculinization of the external 
genitalia.38 In cases of AIS, an infant with XY chromosomes 
develops partially or completely feminized external genitalia.39
Infants with AIS either lack androgen receptors or do not have fully 
functional androgen receptors; as a result, they develop male internal 
gonads and feminized external genitalia.40 These conditions serve as 
evidence that sex development is far more complex than merely 
examining chromosomes or genitalia: During the long process of in 
utero sexual development, hormonal variations, chromosome 
recombination, and environmental factors can all contribute to the 
formation of an infant’s biological sex.41 However, the concealment-
based method of treatment for intersex children is largely based on 
the work of one psychologist, John Money, who believed that a child 
who underwent genital surgery in infancy could successfully be 
socialized to the assigned gender.42
B. Development of Concealment-Based Treatment 
The concealment-based model for intersex case management 
requires that the intersex child be assigned a sex soon after birth.43
After assignment, the parents are instructed to raise their child as the 
assigned gender and never disclose the intersex condition to the 
child.44 This model was made famous by John Money, a psychologist 
                                                     
37. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 2, at 51. 
38. N.K. Alizai et al., Feminizing Genitoplasty for Congenital Adrenal 
Hyperplasia: What Happens at Puberty?, 161 J. UROLOGY 1588, 1588 (1999). 
39. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 2, at 52. An infant may have either 
Complete AIS or Partial AIS. Infants with CAIS develop entirely female external 
genitalia; in infants with PAIS, the external genitalia may be more ambiguous 
because of the shortage of androgens in development. Id. at 52-53. 
40. Id. at 52. 
41. Id. at 52-53.  
42. GERMON, supra note 28, at 36-37.  
43. See Dreger, supra note 27, at 16-17.
44. Id. In fact, under the concealment model, the parents themselves may 
not be given all the information necessary to make an informed choice about their 
child’s surgery. Id. Doctors may instead choose to give the parents minimal 
information on their child’s condition in order to prevent confusion and anxiety. See 
id. at 12. 
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at Johns Hopkins University, in the 1950s.45 Money proposed that 
there was a “critical period” for gender acquisition in a child’s life, 
and during that period the child could be successfully assigned to 
either gender.46 The critical period would last for the first eighteen 
months of the child’s life; during that time, the child was more 
susceptible to environmental stimuli, and gender identity could be 
permanently shaped by exposure to masculine or feminine stimuli.47
Money believed that the appearance of external genitalia was the 
most significant factor to consider when assigning gender.48
Money was granted the opportunity to test his hypothesis when 
he was approached by the parents of Bruce Reimer, an infant who 
had his penis burnt off during a circumcision.49 Thus, the surgery and 
concealment-based model for intersex case management was based 
on a case study of an individual who was not actually born with an 
intersex condition.50 The case provided a particularly compelling 
opportunity for Money to test his hypothesis because Bruce had an 
identical twin brother, Brian, who had not suffered from a botched 
circumcision.51 Thus, Money advised the parents to have Bruce 
surgically assigned to the female sex and to raise him as a girl.52
Money saw the accident as an opportunity to compare gender 
development of the two twins in tandem and ultimately hoped to 
show that gender identity is based entirely on childrearing, as 
opposed to biology.53 In what became the famous John–Joan case 
study, Money met with both children regularly in early childhood to 
                                                     
45. See FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 2, at 66. 
46. See generally GERMON, supra note 28. 
47. Id. at 36-37.
48. Id. at 41. Money acknowledged that other factors, such as chromosomes 
and gonads, play a role in gender determination, but nevertheless chose to 
emphasize the appearance of external genitalia as the most determinative factor. Id. 
49. Hazel Glenn Beh & Milton Diamond, An Emerging Ethical and 
Medical Dilemma: Should Physicians Perform Sex Assignment Surgery on Infants 
with Ambiguous Genitalia?, 7 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6 (2000); Alison Davidian, 
Beyond the Locker Room: Changing Narratives on Early Surgery for Intersex 
Children, 26 WIS. J.L., GENDER & SOC’Y 1, 6 n.30 (2011). 
50. See id. 
51. Id. 
52. As Bruce Reimer eventually rejected the gender assignment, changed 
his name to “David,” and began living as a male, I use male pronouns to refer to him 
throughout this paper. Davidian, supra note 49, at 6-7.
53. Id. at 5-6.
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observe how Bruce, renamed “Brenda,” adjusted to his female role in 
comparison to his twin brother.54
However, Money’s experiment failed to produce the results 
that he had expected.55 Even though Money had instructed the 
parents never to tell “Brenda” about his sex at birth, Brenda rejected 
the female gender role from early on in his life.56 From an early age, 
Brenda had avoided playing with “girl” toys, like dolls; had refused 
to wear dresses; and was teased at school for standing up to urinate.57
By age fourteen, Brenda informed his father that he had always felt 
that he was a boy.58 Eventually, Brenda changed his name to “David” 
and underwent surgery and hormone replacement to reassign his 
body as male.59 Even though Money knew that his experiment had 
failed, he misrepresented his findings and widely reported the sex 
reassignment as a success.60 The idea that gender was purely 
determined by socialization was embraced by sociologists, 
psychologists, and feminists.61 Finally, in 1997, it was revealed that 
David had always rejected his gender assignment and that Money 
had misrepresented the success of the experiment for decades.62
However, by this time, Money’s model for early surgical 
intervention had become so entrenched in the medical literature that 
it remained the standard of care for children born with intersex 
conditions, despite the failure of the very experiment on which the 
standard was based.63 However, attempts by intersex activists and 
                                                     
54. SHARON E. PREVES, INTERSEX AND IDENTITY: THE CONTESTED SELF 96 
(2003). When Money published his findings on this case, he referred to it as the 
“John/Joan” case, signifying that the child born male, or “John,” had been 
successfully transformed into a female, or “Joan.” Beh & Diamond, supra note 49,
at 6-7.
55. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 49, at 10-11. 
56. See id. at 8.  
57. See id. at 10-11 (citing Milton Diamond & H. Keith Sigmundson, Sex 
Reassignment at Birth: Long-Term Review and Clinical Implications, 151 ARCHIVES 
PEDIATRIC ADOLESCENT MED. 298, 299-300 (1997)). 
58. Id. at 11.  
59. Id.  
60. See generally PREVES, supra note 54. 
61. See id. at 96. The study was viewed as a nail in the coffin of biological 
determinism, proving that “nature” was more important than “nurture.” See
KESSLER, supra note 9, at 23-24 (stating that since proliferation of Money’s theory 
of gender identity development, physicians advise parents that “providing the 
appropriate social conditions [will] produce the ‘real’ gender”).
62. See PREVES, supra note 54, at 96; Davidian, supra note 49, at 7. As an 
adult, David Reimer had a wife and adopted children before committing suicide at 
age thirty-eight. Id.
63. Davidian, supra note 49, at 8. 
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medical professionals to change the current standard of treatment 
have been gaining traction in the past decade.64
C. Moving Away from Surgical Intervention 
The surgical-intervention model for intersex case management 
is based on intersex conditions constituting a “social emergency.”65
In one study, physicians reported that genital surgery in infancy was 
necessary to put parents at ease with their child, encourage bonding 
between parent and child, and allow parents to avoid the discomfort 
of explaining their child’s condition to family and friends.66
However, surgery in infancy does not provide the permanent “fix” 
parents and doctors seek when choosing to surgically assign a 
newborn’s sex;67 in fact, many children who undergo surgery in 
infancy require further genital surgeries as they enter puberty and 
adulthood.68 In addition to the possible requirement of additional 
surgery, genital surgery on infants may result in sterilization or loss 
of sensation.69 These negative consequences, coupled with the fact 
                                                     
64. See infra Section I.C. 
65. Evaluation of the Newborn with Developmental Anomalies of the 
External Genitalia, 106 PEDIATRICS 138, 138 (2000) [hereinafter Developmental 
Anomalies].
66. KESSLER, supra note 9, at 32 (stating that parental anxiety and 
discomfort with having to explain their infant’s intersex condition has been cited by 
doctors as one reason to perform sex assignment surgery in infancy). 
67. See, e.g., Alizai et al., supra note 38, at 1588 (“[S]ince the 1970s, the 
philosophical basis for the surgical management of congenital adrenal hyperplasia 
has centered on the assumption that [genitoplasty and vaginoplasty] can be achieved 
with a 1-stage procedure during infancy.”).
68. See, e.g., id. at 1590 (finding that vaginoplasty should be postponed to 
adolescence, as surgery in infancy “may be counter-productive by provoking 
scarring and fibrosis”); Sarah M. Creighton, Catherine L. Minto & Stuart J. Steele, 
Objective Cosmetic and Anatomical Outcomes at Adolescence of Feminising 
Surgery for Ambiguous Genitalia Done in Childhood, 358 LANCET 124, 125 (2001) 
(finding that the majority of patients in a sample of intersex individuals who had 
surgery in infancy needed further vaginoplasty or clitoral surgery in adolescence); 
Catherine L. Minto et al., The Effect of Clitoral Surgery on Sexual Outcome in 
Individuals Who Have Intersex Conditions with Ambiguous Genitalia: A Cross-
Sectional Study, 361 LANCET 1252, 1256 (2003) (finding that women who had 
undergone clitoral surgery for ambiguous genitalia were substantially more likely to 
be aorgasmic than control group women). But see H.F.L. Meyer-Bahlburg et al., 
Attitudes of Adult 46,XY Intersex Persons to Clinical Management Policies, 171 J.
UROLOGY 1615, 1617 (2004) (finding that a majority of the intersex adults were 
satisfied with their gender assignment and would not recommend postponing 
surgery to adulthood). 
69. GREENBERG, supra note 33, at 32-35.
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that the surgeries are purely cosmetic, suggest that surgical treatment 
in infancy is not only unnecessary, but also irresponsible.70
In response to criticisms of intersex case management, the 
Lawson Wilkins Pediatric Endocrine Society and the European 
Society for Paediatric Endocrinology created a task force of 
physicians to analyze the issue and develop a new treatment 
method.71 In the Consensus Statement released in 2006, the task force 
recognized that genital surgery is unnecessary in many cases and that 
gender is not determined solely by the appearance of the child’s 
genitals.72 The treatment scheme that the task force developed 
eschews the concealment-centered approach in favor of open 
communication with parents and patients and counseling as to how 
the parents can address their child’s intersex condition with family 
and friends.73 Most importantly, the statement would limit surgical 
intervention to times when it is necessary for the child to have fully 
functional genitalia; purely cosmetic surgeries are to be avoided.74
The statement recommends surgery only to correct hypospadias,75 to 
                                                     
70. See id.; see also supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
71. See generally Lee et al., supra note 15. 
72. Id. at e491 (“Factors that influence gender assignment include 
diagnosis, genital appearance, surgical options, need for lifelong replacement 
therapy, potential for fertility, views of the family, and, sometimes, circumstances 
relating to cultural practices.”).
73. Id. at e492-93. The committee’s Consensus Statement identifies five 
key factors for successful intersex case management: 
(1) gender assignment must be avoided before expert evaluation in 
newborns; (2) evaluation and long-term management must be performed 
at a center with an experienced multidisciplinary team; (3) all individuals 
should receive a gender assignment; (4) open communication with patients 
and families is essential, and participation in decision-making is 
encouraged; and (5) patient and family concerns should be respected and 
addressed in strict confidence. 
Id. at e490. 
74. Id. at e491 (“Because orgasmic function and erectile sensation may be 
disturbed by clitoral surgery . . . . [e]mphasis is on functional outcome rather than a 
strictly cosmetic appearance.”).
75. Hypospadias—a condition in which the urethra is not located at the tip 
of the penis—provides a stark example of how determinations of “normal” in genital 
construction can be arbitrary decisions. KESSLER, supra note 9, at 49-50. It is 
medically unnecessary to conduct surgery for the sole reason of correcting 
hypospadias. Id. at 69-70 (“[N]one of the 150 different surgical techniques to repair 
hypospadias are medically necessary to reduce pain or prevent illness.”). To further 
illustrate how intersex conditions can be viewed as more of a social problem than a 
medical one, a study revealed that the urethral opening was only located in the 
“normal” area in 55% of men. FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 2, at 57 (citing J. 
Fichter et al., Analysis of Meatal Location in 500 Men: Wide Variation Questions 
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remove testes of AIS patients, or to correct “severe virilization,”
which refers to a larger phallus in female infants.76 Any further 
vaginoplasty or phalloplasty can be postponed until adolescence, 
allowing the patient a greater opportunity to participate in the 
decision.77 Thus, the Consensus Statement is a far less extreme 
method of intersex case management than the traditional 
concealment-based model despite still advocating for genital surgery 
in some cases.78
One intersex advocacy group, ISNA, proposed a patient-
centered intersex case-management system in which all medically 
unnecessary surgery is postponed until the child can consent to 
treatment.79 ISNA does recommend that parents and doctors work 
together to choose one gender of rearing, but maintains that sex 
assignment surgery is not necessary to development of a healthy 
gender identity.80 ISNA’s patient-centered treatment model prohibits 
all medically unnecessary treatment, even in cases of severe 
virilization.81 Simply, ISNA’s proposed treatment model and mission 
as an organization emphasizes that biological variations in genital 
construction occur naturally and should not, absent any adverse 
complications, be considered medical problems.82
                                                                                                               
Need for Meatal Advancement in All Pediatric Anterior Hypospadias Cases, 154 J.
UROLOGY 833, 833-34 (1995)). Based on these results, Fausto-Sterling suggests that 
correcting hypospadias is less a medical decision for the child than a social decision 
to put parents and peers at ease with the child. Id. at 58. 
76. Lee et al., supra note 15, at e491-92. The Consensus Statement 
acknowledges that even when surgery is limited to a few specific types of DSD, it is 
likely that most patients will require further surgery in puberty. Id. at e492.  
77. Id. at e491-92. 
78. Id. 
79. DREGER, supra note 14. In fact, ISNA suggests that surgery should not 
be considered until the person with the intersex condition actually requests the 
surgery, is fully informed of all risks, and has had the opportunity to speak with 
other individuals who have undergone the surgery. Id. ISNA also emphasizes that 
parents and doctors should not hide the intersex condition from the child, as this 
type of concealment can ultimately harm, rather than help, the child. Id. (“Secrecy 
and lack of information lead to shame, trauma, and medical procedures that may be 
dangerous to the patient’s health.”).
80. Id. (“We advocate assigning a male or female gender because intersex is 
not, and will never be, a discreet biological category any more than male or female 
is, and because assigning an ‘intersexed’ gender would unnecessarily traumatize the 
child.”). However, parents should be aware that their child may choose a different 
gender identity later in life. See id.  
81. Id.  
82. See id.
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The 2006 Consensus Statement and ISNA’s patient-centered 
treatment model both represent a considerable step forward in 
intersex case management, but neither system is mandated within the 
medical field.83 The American Academy of Pediatrics has endorsed 
the 2006 Consensus Statement’s treatment model, but many doctors 
and health care organizations do not currently adhere to this model.84
The Accord Alliance, an intersex activist group that replaced ISNA 
in 200885 to advocate for implementation of the Consensus Statement 
model, has provided resources online and worked with different 
health care teams to implement the new strategy.86 However, many 
physicians still employ the surgical treatment method.87
II. PRIVACY AND SELF-DEFINITION
The right to privacy is derived from the Substantive Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,88 which protects rights 
that are deemed “fundamental.”89 Substantive due process has been 
the subject of considerable debate since its inception, as the rights it 
has been invoked to protect are not explicitly enumerated in the 
                                                     
83. See Lee et al., supra note 15, at e496; Davidian, supra note 49, at 11. 
84. See FAQs, ACCORD ALLIANCE, http://www.accordalliance.org/learn-
about-dsd/faqs (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
85. Dear ISNA Friends and Supporters, INTERSEX SOC’Y N. AM.,
http://www.isna.org/farewell_message (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). After the 
Consensus Statement was published, ISNA hoped to aid in implementation so that 
the proposed model could become the reality for treatment. Id. However, ISNA had 
little success because “there [was] concern among many healthcare professionals, 
parents, and mainstream healthcare system funders that ISNA’s views are biased or 
that an association with ISNA will be frowned upon by colleagues and peers.” Id. As 
a result, ISNA worked with clinicians and intersex advocates to help form the 
Accord Alliance, a non-profit with the sole purpose of aiding in implementation of 
the new model and advocating for health care organizations to adopt the American 
Association of Pediatrics’s recommendation of the new treatment model. Id.; Our 
Mission: A New Standard of Care, ACCORD ALLIANCE, http://www.accordalliance. 
org/about-accord-alliance/our-mission (last visited Feb. 8, 2016). 
86. See ACCORD ALLIANCE, supra note 84. 
87. See Davidian, supra note 49, at 11. 
88. The clause prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  
89. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-20 (1997) (“[I]n 
addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ 
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry; to have 
children; to direct the education and upbringing of one’s children; to marital privacy; 
to use contraception; to bodily integrity; and to abortion.” (citations omitted)).
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Constitution.90 Nevertheless, the right to not have the government 
intrude on citizens’ private, intimate moments is perhaps one of the 
most important rights retained by the people.91 This right was 
originally established to provide protections for marital privacy 
between consenting adults, as well as privacy in the doctor–patient 
relationship.92 The right has since been extended to minors in cases 
dealing with abortion and contraception to guarantee a degree of 
privacy from government and parents in making important decisions 
about reproductive health.93
A. The Early Privacy Doctrine 
The substantive due process right to privacy was first 
articulated by Justice Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut.94 In 
Griswold, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that 
prohibited citizens from using contraceptives and from counseling or 
aiding another person in obtaining contraceptives.95 The Griswold
Court found that privacy is implicated in the First, Third, Fourth, 
Fifth, and Ninth Amendments.96 Justice Douglas noted that each of 
these amendments have “penumbras” creating a zone of privacy 
protected from intrusion by the government outside those of which 
are enumerated in the amendments.97 Since recognizing privacy as a 
90. For a discussion of the history of substantive due process and the
arguments for and against recognizing the doctrine, see E. THOMAS SULLIVAN &
TONI M. MASSARO, THE ARC OF DUE PROCESS IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
123-25 (2013). 
91. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 418 (1990); Carey v.
Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
94. 381 U.S. at 486. Though this is the first case in which the right to
privacy was specifically identified, one commenter notes that Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), are 
considered “the true parents of the privacy doctrine.” Jed Rubenfeld, The Right to 
Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 743 (1989). These cases, which dealt with the 
rights of parents in deciding the type of education their children would receive, are 
discussed in more detail in Part III of this Note. 
95. 381 U.S. at 485. This case reached the Supreme Court after two
physicians were convicted under the statute after giving medical advice and 
prescribing contraceptives to married couples. Id. at 480. 
96. Id. at 484.
97. Id. at 484-85. For example, the Third and Fourth Amendments carried
an implicit guarantee of privacy in one’s own home, such that the government could 
not intrude to quarter soldiers or conduct unreasonable searches and seizures. Id.
at 484. 
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fundamental right, the Court has used the privacy right in numerous 
cases involving sexual relationships, family relationships, the 
doctor–patient relationship, and medical decision-making.98
Ultimately, these decisions can be viewed as a right to self-
determination, or the idea that there are certain fundamental aspects 
of identity, such as sexuality, parenthood, or marital status, on which 
the state may not intrude.99 One academic refers to the abstract 
concept of “personhood” as underlying privacy jurisprudence and 
providing the basis for protecting self-definition as a part of the basic 
right to privacy, and this abstract principle is supported in the 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence as it has developed over the years.100 In 
Lawrence v. Texas, the Court stated that “[l]iberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct.”101 These aspects of identity
are so essential to individual personhood that even though self-
determination is not enumerated within the Constitution these 
aspects cannot be redefined or dictated by the state without offending 
the most basic societal beliefs about the role of government in 
democracy.102 Privacy has then been read somewhat expansively to 
protect unenumerated, or implicit, rights; however, at the same time, 
the Court has traditionally only invoked the privacy doctrine in 
reference to particularly impactful aspects of identity.103 The 
Supreme Court recognized the importance of this amorphous concept 
of self-determination, without interference by the state, in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey:
                                                     
98. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (holding that the state 
cannot criminalize private, consensual sexual conduct); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 
U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (stating that the right to privacy includes the right to define an 
intimate relationship through marriage); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) 
(holding that the right to privacy encompasses the right to decide whether to 
reproduce); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (“If the right of privacy 
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a 
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”).
99. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 753.  
100. Id. at 752-53. 
101. 539 U.S. at 562. 
102. See Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 753 (“[S]ome acts, faculties, or 
qualities are so important to our identity as persons—as human beings—that they 
must remain inviolable, at least as against the state.”).
103. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (analyzing right to sexual intimacy 
without intrusion by state); Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (applying privacy to the decision to 
reproduce). 
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Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, 
and education. . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s
own concept of existence . . . .104
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Casey recognizes that certain 
decisions, such as whether to have a child or get married, have far-
reaching consequences for the individual that would caution against 
allowing the government to play a dispositive role in the decision-
making process.105 Therefore, while it can be difficult to truly define 
privacy and self-determination, the Court has acknowledged that 
certain parts of human identity are so sacred that the state has an 
obligation to refrain from interfering with the individual’s right to 
shape his or her own identity.106
The Court’s consistent treatment of life-altering reproductive 
choices as within the scope of the individual right to privacy 
indicates that medical decisions about one’s own body—such as the 
decision to use contraceptives or to terminate a pregnancy—are 
respected by the Court as personal, private choices upon which a 
state may not intrude at will.107 For example, the decision to become 
a parent has a strong influence on an individual’s day-to-day life, as 
well as on the development of identity; in Roe v. Wade, the Court 
held that such an important decision should be left to the woman and 
her doctor, not to the state.108 More abstractly, the medical choices 
the Court has recognized as within the purview of the right to 
privacy involve personal autonomy and the “right to be free from 
unwanted invasion of his or her person.”109 These medical decisions 
follow the individuals throughout their lives and have a lasting 
impact beyond consent to the average medical treatment or 
procedure.110 Tonsil surgery or wisdom tooth removal, for example, 
simply do not carry the same significance to individual identity in the 
                                                     
104. 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
105. Id. 
106. See id.; Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 753. 
107. See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 114; Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 438 
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).  
108. 410 U.S. at 164. 
109. Sara A. Aliabadi, Note, Gender Assignment Surgery for Intersexed 
Infants: How the Substantive Due Process Right to Privacy Both Supports and 
Opposes a Moratorium, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 170, 184 (2004). 
110. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. 
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contemporary cultural milieu as the decision to become, or not 
become, a parent.111 Ultimately, minors are even more influenced by 
the life-altering effects of certain medical decisions, such as the 
choice to terminate a pregnancy, and the Court has taken steps to 
protect their privacy rights notwithstanding parents’ general 
authority to make medical decisions for their children.112 These 
decisions, described below, are strong indication that the Court 
considers even minors to have rights, separate from parental control, 
to make decisions that are highly impactful on their futures.113
B. Privacy Rights of Minors 
The Court has made clear that minors are entitled to a degree of 
privacy in making important medical decisions that will have lasting 
effects on their lives and sense of self.114 In particular, the Court’s 
numerous decisions requiring judicial bypass procedures for minors 
who wish to obtain an abortion without parental notification strongly 
suggest that minors are entitled to a degree of privacy in deciding 
whether to reproduce.115 More importantly, the fact that the Court has 
mandated judicial bypass procedures in abortion statutes as applied 
to minors indicates that the decision to reproduce is important 
enough that a minor’s right to participate in the decision cannot be 
infringed.116 Rather, the state can place limited restrictions on the 
minor’s right to make the decision to reproduce, such as imposing 
parental notification requirements, but the state cannot go so far as to 
prevent minors entirely from obtaining abortion sans parental 
consent.117
                                                     
111. See Aliabadi, supra note 109, at 184 (describing the significance of 
certain intrusions by the state upon the individual’s body).
112. See infra Part III. 
113. See infra Section II.B. 
114. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (holding that one parent veto power is constitutional as long as 
the state provided judicial bypass for minors who do not wish to inform their 
parents); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (holding that states may 
not require a minor to notify both parents before seeking an abortion, even when 
judicial bypass is another available option); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 
U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (holding that the state cannot impose on a minor’s right to 
privacy by making it nearly impossible for the minor to obtain contraception). 
115. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899; Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 423; Bellotti v. Baird, 
443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979). 
116. See, e.g., Lambert v. Wicklund, 520 U.S. 292, 295-96 (1997) (per 
curiam). 
117. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 423. 
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In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court held that a state may create laws 
to encourage minors to tell their parents that they would like to have 
an abortion, but the state cannot make parental consent a prerequisite 
for every minor seeking an abortion.118 Rather, the state must have in 
place some alternative procedure for minors who do not wish to 
notify their parents that they are seeking an abortion so that the 
minor can prove that she is either mature enough to make the 
decision on her own or that the abortion would be in her best 
interest.119 The Bellotti test then balances a state’s important interest 
in protecting its minors with the minor’s interest in maintaining 
bodily autonomy and shaping his or her own lifelong identity.120 This 
is a fact-specific inquiry, and states may not fashion a system in 
which virtually all such requests are rejected by default.121 In an 
earlier case invalidating a law requiring parental consent for a 
minor’s abortion, the Court stated that the parents’ interest in their 
daughter’s abortion does not outweigh the daughter’s right to 
privacy.122 Thus, when confronted with three competing interests—
those of the state, the parent, and the minor—the Court determined 
that notwithstanding the limitations on minors’ rights, the right to 
privacy with respect to abortion can outweigh the interests of the 
state and the parent.123
The Court also emphasized in Bellotti that while the decision to 
reproduce might more desirably be made in adulthood, a minor who 
is seeking an abortion does not have the luxury of waiting until she 
reaches the age of majority to decide whether to terminate the 
pregnancy.124 In that situation, a serious, life-changing decision must 
be made to the best of the minor’s ability without the added wisdom 
or security that comes with adulthood.125 The Court noted that there 
are few decisions a minor can make that would have such “grave and 
indelible” consequences.126 Thus, while preferable that minors speak 
with their parents about the decision, it is also important to allow 
them to make the decision to terminate a pregnancy, if necessary, 
                                                     
118. See 443 U.S. at 643. 
119. See id. at 643-44. 
120. See id. at 642-43. 
121. See id. at 643-44, 653 n.23. In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976), the Court found unconstitutional a judicial 
bypass procedure that essentially guaranteed that all requests would be denied. 
122. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 75. 
123. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643-44. 
124. See id. at 642. 
125. See id. 
126. Id. 
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without consulting their parents.127 The gravity of the decision on the 
minor’s life in the long term rendered it simply unconstitutional to 
mandate that a third party, the parent, hold a “veto” power over the 
minor’s decision.128 Today, thirty-eight states require some form of 
parental involvement before a minor can obtain an abortion, but all 
of those states have a judicial bypass procedure in place.129 When 
deciding whether to allow the minor to proceed with the abortion 
without parental consent, judges assess factors such as the minor’s
emotional state and her understanding of the consequences of 
terminating a pregnancy.130 Thirteen states require the judge to 
determine that the minor is mature by the elevated standard of clear 
and convincing evidence.131 Simply put, “emotional state” and 
“understanding of the consequences” are factors that require the 
judge to determine the minor’s maturity.132
The limited right to privacy for minors is not restricted to 
termination of pregnancy; in holding that a state may not prohibit 
minors from buying and using hormonal contraception, the Court 
spoke more broadly about the “important decisions” the right to 
privacy protects.133 These “important decisions” are those that have a 
long-term, meaningful impact on the individual’s life, regardless of 
the fact the decision was made during infancy.134 In Carey v. 
Population Services International, the Court explicitly stated that the 
right to privacy, including the right to make general decisions about 
reproduction, extended to minors even outside of the abortion 
context.135 In striking down the statute that prohibited the sale of 
contraception to minors, the Court emphasized past decisions about 
abortion, noting that the decision to terminate a pregnancy has more 
drastic physical and mental-health implications than the decision to 
                                                     
127. Id. at 640-43. The Court also noted that deciding to obtain an abortion 
may raise moral and religious concerns that a minor could best address by speaking 
with her parents. Id.
128. See id. at 639-40; Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 
U.S. 52, 74 (1976). 
129. GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT 
IN MINORS’ ABORTIONS 1 (2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/ 
spib_PIMA.pdf. 
130. Id.  
131. Id. 
132. See id.; Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 642-44.
133. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (quoting 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)). 
134. See id. 
135. Id. at 693. 
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use contraception.136 Because states could not require minors to 
obtain parental consent before an abortion, the Court held that the 
state also could not prohibit minors from taking the less drastic step 
of using hormonal contraception.137 The latter was a logical extension 
of the former—if children were allowed to go so far as to terminate a 
pregnancy without notifying their parents, then children must also be 
allowed to make the safer, less drastic reproductive health decision to 
use contraceptives.138
In addition to holding that states may not grant parents the right 
to unilaterally veto a minor’s decision to have an abortion, the Court 
has emphasized that minors have a First Amendment right to self-
determination and to defining their own identity.139 Thus, the concept 
of personhood that undergirds much of privacy law extends to the 
identity and self-definition of minors as well as adults.140 Perhaps the 
most important reasoning the Court has offered to support allowing 
minors to make reproductive health decisions was the urgency 
argument raised in Bellotti: Having a child is an enormous decision
and responsibility, and the decision is complicated by being time 
sensitive.141 While children might be best off consulting with a parent 
before making this life-altering decision, time is not always on the 
child’s side.142 The Court recognized that when time was of the 
essence, the child’s right to privacy in making the decision must be 
prioritized over the parents’ interest in remaining informed and 
involved in their child’s decisions.143 With time as a factor, the 
minor’s right to privacy trumped the parents’ right to participate in 
the decision and the states’ right to discourage underage abortions.144
The “grave and indelible” consequences of having a child do not 
affect a minor’s future and identity any less than they affected those 
                                                     
136. Id. at 694. 
137. Id. (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 
74 (1976) (striking down a statute that granted a parent or guardian an absolute veto 
power over the child’s decision to obtain an abortion)).
138. Id. (“Since the State may not impose a blanket prohibition, or even a 
blanket requirement of parental consent, on the choice of a minor to terminate her 
pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of the distribution of 
contraceptives to minors is a fortiori foreclosed.”).
139. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). 
140. Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 753 (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 
186, 205 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
141. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 642 (1979). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See id. 
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of an adult.145 This basis for extending the right to privacy as self-
definition to minors in the abortion context can provide support for 
extending a similar right to privacy for children born with intersex 
conditions so that these children can self-define one central aspect of 
their identity: gender.146
III. MEDIATING BETWEEN PARENTAL AND STATE RIGHTS
The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Due Process 
Clause protects “the fundamental right of parents to make decisions 
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”147 This 
deference to parents is largely based on the principle that parents will 
always be better able to act in their children’s best interests than the 
state.148 The Court recognized this principle nearly a century ago, and 
it continues to remain an important aspect of family law and the 
relationship between the individual and the state.149 However, 
parental rights are somewhat tempered by the state’s right to act as 
parens patriae to protect the well-being of its children.150 Both the 
parent and the state have important interests in the well-being of the 
child and exercise a degree of control and responsibility for the 
child’s care.151 However, parents and the state are not always in 
agreement regarding the care of the child.152 Tensions between the 
parental right and the state right have already emerged in cases in 
                                                     
145. Id. 
146. GERMON, supra note 28, at 66-67 (discussing gender as a core identity 
influencing how the individual navigates the world). 
147. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
148. See Emily A. Bishop, Note, A Child’s Expertise: Establishing Statutory 
Protection for Intersexed Children Who Reject Their Gender of Assignment, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 531, 562 (2007); Skylar Curtis, Reproductive Organs and 
Differences of Sex Development: The Constitutional Issues Created by the Surgical 
Treatment of Intersex Children, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 841, 849-50 (2011). 
149. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (including the right to 
“establish a home and bring up children” without state interference as one important 
protected liberty interest within the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause); 
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that the state cannot 
infringe upon the parents’ right to choose private education for their children by 
requiring that all children attend public schools); Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66 (holding that 
the state cannot allow a judge to make a determination about a child’s best interest 
without granting any deference to the parent). 
150. Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on Behalf of the State: A Parens 
Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684, 684 (1998). 
151. See id. 
152. See id.
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which the child needs certain medical treatment to which the parents 
are unwilling to consent, often for religious reasons.153
A. Parental Rights Over Children’s Medical Care 
In Parham v. J.R., the Court recognized that parents and 
children may disagree on the child’s medical care, but in many 
instances the parent’s wishes are given precedence over the child’s 
opinion.154 In particular, the Court held that the parental right to make 
decisions for children extends to the drastic decision to have the 
child involuntarily committed to a mental-health institution.155
Parham involved a class-action suit challenging a Georgia statute 
allowing parents to have their children committed to psychiatric 
hospitals against the child’s wishes.156 The statute in question 
allowed parents to submit applications for commitment of children 
under the age of eighteen to the superintendent of any of the state’s 
mental-health facilities.157 While the specific admittance policies and 
criteria varied from facility to facility, in all cases the superintendent 
of the facility could choose to accept the child or deny the parent’s
request.158 After commitment, hospital staff or administrators 
reviewed the decision, and the hospital was not required to consider 
the child’s wishes when determining whether to keep the child in 
treatment.159 A child who was received into a facility could be kept 
for observation and treatment until the facility had determined that 
the child had adequately recovered and no longer required 
hospitalization.160 Alternatively, a parent or guardian could choose to 
discharge the child after the child had been hospitalized for at least 
five days.161
In upholding the statute, the Court emphasized the parental 
right to make decisions about childrearing without significant 
interference from the state, even though children have a protected 
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment in not being 
                                                     
153. See infra Section III.C; see also Barry Nobel, Religious Healing in the 
Courts: The Liberties and Liabilities of Patients, Parents, and Healers, 16 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 599, 654 (1993). 
154. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). 
155. See id. at 601-02. 
156. See id. at 588 n.3.
157. See id. 
158. See id. at 591. 
159. See id. at 588 & n.3, 589. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. at 591. 
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involuntarily committed.162 Of course, the statute also delegated some 
power to the state by requiring administrative approval of any 
involuntary commitment by hospital personnel before the child could 
be officially accepted into the hospital’s care.163 The interests of the 
three implicated parties were then characterized as follows: The 
parents hold the initial right to determine that the child needs care 
and to seek institutionalization; the state reviews the parent’s 
decision and, in most cases, accepted the child into the institution;164
and the child remained powerless in the proceeding, despite the 
strong liberty interest in not being confined.165 This parental right 
allowed parents to make medical decisions in the child’s best 
interests, regardless of the child’s expressed preferences.166 While 
primary decision-making power rested with the parents, this right 
was nonetheless tempered by the hospital administration’s ability to 
refuse to admit a child when necessary.167
The Parham Court reached its decision in part on the basis that 
children are incompetent to make their own medical decisions.168
Ultimately, this incompetency was weighted more heavily than the 
child’s admitted protected liberty interest in not being involuntarily 
confined.169 Competency determinations take into account the 
                                                     
162. See, e.g., id. at 602 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 
(1925); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)). “It is not disputed that a 
child, in common with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined 
unnecessarily for medical treatment and that the state’s involvement in the 
commitment decision constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id.
at 600. 
163. See id. at 588 & n.3, 589, 591. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. at 600. 
166. See id. at 604 (“The fact that a child may balk at hospitalization or 
complain about a parental refusal to provide cosmetic surgery does not diminish the 
parents’ authority to decide what is best for the child.”). In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Stewart argued that children should be afforded the same due process 
protections that the Court had afforded to adults being involuntarily committed to a 
mental institution. Id. at 627 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“Constitutional rights do not 
mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of 
majority. Minors as well as adults are protected by the Constitution and possess 
constitutional rights.”). Justice Stewart argued that children should be afforded the 
same right that adults have to a formal hearing in front of a neutral decision maker 
before being involuntarily committed. Id. at 627, 630 (citing Specht v. Patterson, 
386 U.S. 605, 610 (1967)). 
167. See id. at 591 (majority opinion). 
168. Id. at 603 (“Most children, even in adolescence, simply are not able to 
make sound judgments . . . .”).
169. See id. at 600. 
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person’s ability to communicate his or her choices to others: whether 
the person understands the medical condition, treatment options, and 
potential consequences of treatment; whether the person can 
understand the information necessary to make an informed decision; 
and whether the person can rationally consider the information.170
Children, particularly young children, are generally not considered 
competent to make their own medical decisions.171 The presumption 
of children’s incompetence, combined with the “social emergency”
created by the birth of an intersex child, has led to the widespread 
practice of parents consenting to life-altering surgery on infants who 
would not be considered competent to participate in the 
determination of their own gender for nearly two decades.172
B. The Doctrine of Parens Patriae 
In defining the doctrine of parens patriae, the Court has held 
that the state will always have a “quasi-sovereign interest in the 
health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its residents 
in general.”173 States commonly invoke the doctrine of parens patriae
to protect the safety and well-being of children in cases concerning 
child abuse, such as allowing a state worker to remove the child from 
the parents’ home as a precautionary measure to protect against 
further abuse.174 Thus, when the well-being of the child is at stake, 
                                                     
170. See Anthony W. Austin, Note, Medical Decisions and Children: How 
Much Voice Should Children Have in Their Medical Care?, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 
150 (2007). 
171. See id. at 152; see also Gary B. Melton, Children’s Competence to 
Consent: A Problem in Law and Social Science, in CHILDREN’S COMPETENCE TO 
CONSENT 5, 10 (Gary B. Melton, Gerald P. Koocher & Michael J. Saks eds., 1983)
(criticizing the majority in Parham for basing its holding about children’s 
competence on “largely unsupported empirical assumptions” about mental health, 
psychology, and the family). 
172. See Developmental Anomalies, supra note 65, at 138; Marie Fox & 
Michael Thomson, Cutting It: Surgical Interventions and the Sexing of Children, 12 
CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 81, 85 (2005). 
173. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 
(1982). This was the first of two categories of quasi-sovereign interests the Court 
identified. Id. The second quasi-sovereign interest of the state was in “not being 
discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.” Id. 
174. Thomason v. SCAN Volunteer Servs., Inc., 85 F.3d 1365, 1373 (8th 
Cir. 1996) (“Where a treating physician has clearly expressed his or her reasonable 
suspicion that life-threatening abuse is occurring in the home, the interest of the 
child (as shared by the state as parens patriae) in being removed from that home 
setting to a safe and neutral environment outweighs the parents’ private interest in 
familial integrity as a matter of law.” (emphasis added)). Government officials can 
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the state retains an interest that can trump that of the parents, even 
given the heavy weight the Court has traditionally afforded family 
privacy and integrity.175 The state can also act as parens patriae to 
pass broader legislation protecting the health and well-being of a 
child, in addition to using the power to intervene in the family 
through the courts or administrative agencies.176
The Supreme Court articulated the states’ right to act as parens 
patriae of its resident children in Prince v. Massachusetts, in which 
the plaintiff, a Jehovah’s Witness, brought her nine-year-old niece 
with her to sell pamphlets to passersby on the street.177 Because the 
two were attempting to sell the pamphlets, rather than distributing 
them for free, the petitioner was arrested under a state statute that 
prohibited parents and guardians from allowing girls under the age of 
eighteen to engage in child labor.178 The young girl in fact did not 
make any money selling the pamphlets on the night in question, but 
this was irrelevant to the Court’s analysis.179 While the Court 
acknowledged that the law does not usually allow the state to 
intervene in the private affairs of a family,180 it stated that in limited 
situations, “the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting 
child labor, and in many other ways.”181 Thus, in Prince, two of the 
plaintiff’s fundamental rights were at issue: The right, as articulated 
in Meyer,182 of the plaintiff to raise her child as she saw fit; and the 
First Amendment right of the plaintiff to exercise her religious 
                                                                                                               
also use their power under parens patriae to simply remove a child from her home 
for questioning when the officials believe that the child would have trouble 
discussing abuse in front of the parents. J.B. v. Wash. Cty., 127 F.3d 919, 925 (10th 
Cir. 1997) (“[C]onsiderable deference should be given to the judgment of 
responsible government officials in acting to protect children from perceived
imminent danger or abuse.” (quoting J.B. v. Wash. Cty., 905 F. Supp. 979, 986 (D. 
Utah 1995))). 
175. See Thomason, 85 F.3d at 1373. 
176. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 160-61 (1944); see 
also CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013). 
177. Prince, 321 U.S. at 159. The plaintiff was the girl’s legal guardian at the 
time. See id. at 160. 
178. See id. at 161. 
179. See id. at 162. 
180. Id. at 165-66 (citing W.V. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 
U.S. 390 (1923)). 
181. Id. at 166 (footnotes omitted). 
182. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. 
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beliefs through distributing pamphlets to the public.183 The Court 
firmly held that, regardless of the plaintiff’s personal religious 
beliefs and parental autonomy, she could not violate the statute by 
allowing her child to engage in prohibited labor.184 The Court stated 
that parents cannot “make martyrs of their children before they have 
reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that 
choice for themselves.”185 Regardless of the protection afforded the 
family and the adult’s First Amendment rights, the government 
retained the right to intervene to protect the child from being 
exploited for labor.186
As seen in Prince, it can be difficult to reconcile the state’s 
interest in protecting the well-being of children with the overarching 
parental right to choose how to raise children, particularly when 
additional constitutional rights are implicated.187 In a more recent 
example of this balancing of interests, California, acting as parens 
patriae, passed a statute prohibiting parents from requiring their 
children to undergo “sexual orientation change efforts,” otherwise 
known as conversion therapy, in an attempt to “convert” a 
homosexual child to heterosexuality.188 “Sexual orientation change 
effort” is defined in the statute as “any practices by mental health 
providers that seek to change an individual’s sexual orientation.”189
The statute prohibits all mental-health providers from having 
individuals under the age of eighteen undergo conversion therapy.190
Thus, while the statute is directly aimed at regulating mental-health 
professionals, in practice, it serves its purpose by undercutting 
parents’ traditional right to make medical decisions, including 
mental-health decisions, on behalf of their children.191 In passing the 
bill, the California legislature listed numerous studies by professional 
organizations, such as the American Psychological Association and 
the American Psychiatric Association, in which researchers found 
that conversion therapy often results in depression, suicidal ideation, 
                                                     
183. Prince, 321 U.S. at 167. 
184. Id. at 170. 
185. Id. 
186. See id. at 167-68. 
187. See id. at 166-67 (weighing constitutional rights of parents against 
state’s right to act as parens patriae in prohibiting certain forms of child labor). 
188. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865.1 (West 2013).  
189. Id. § 865(b)(1). 
190. Id. § 865.1. 
191. See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (affirming parental 
right to have minor children involuntarily committed to mental-health institutions). 
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substance abuse, and low self-esteem.192 The session laws for 
California’s act specify that the state has a “compelling interest in 
protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors” that 
justified limitations on parents’ rights to seek this professional 
treatment for their children.193
In reviewing the law, the Ninth Circuit held that California had 
not unduly intruded upon parental rights by prohibiting mental-
health professionals from providing minors with conversion 
therapy.194 In Pickup v. Brown, parents and mental-health providers 
brought suit seeking an injunction against the law, claiming, inter 
alia, that it violated parents’ fundamental right to make decisions 
about their children’s medical treatment.195 The court rejected this 
argument.196 While the court acknowledged that parents have a 
general right to dictate their children’s medical care, the court also 
found that “the fundamental rights of parents do not include the right 
to choose a specific type of provider for a specific medical or mental 
health treatment that the state has reasonably deemed harmful.”197
Thus, despite challenges made by medical professionals involved in 
the suit, the court deferred to the legislature’s research indicating that 
the therapy is ultimately harmful.198 In so holding, the court 
recognized that the legislature is capable of making judgments 
                                                     
192. 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569 (“Being lesbian, gay, or bisexual is not a disease, 
disorder, illness, deficiency, or shortcoming. The major professional associations of 
mental health practitioners and researchers in the United States have recognized this 
fact for nearly 40 years.”).
193. See id. at 6569-71 (summarizing the professional research conducted on 
conversion therapy and explaining that the state has the right to protect minors from 
“exposure to serious harms” caused by conversion therapy).
194. Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1235 (9th Cir. 2014) (denying petition 
for rehearing en banc). This case consolidated two challenges to the law brought in 
California district courts. Id. at 1224-25. In the first case, the court granted the 
plaintiffs an injunction against the law after holding that the law violated the First 
Amendment and was likely to fail strict scrutiny. Welch v. Brown, 907 F. Supp. 2d 
1102, 1105 (E.D. Cal. 2012). In the second case, the court denied the plaintiffs’ 
motion for an injunction after finding that the law regulated conduct, not speech, and 
was subject only to rational basis review. Pickup v. Brown, 42 F. Supp. 3d 1347, 
1375-77 (E.D. Cal. 2012). 
195. 740 F.3d at 1235. The suit also challenged the law as overbroad and as a 
violation of mental-health providers’ and minor patients’ rights to free speech under 
the First Amendment. Id. at 1222. 
196. Id. at 1236. 
197. Id. 
198. See id. 
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regarding medical care with the aim of keeping children safe.199 The 
state’s judgment about the safety and efficacy of conversion therapy 
was well supported by the evidence enumerated in the session law.200
In 2013, the New Jersey legislature passed a ban on conversion 
therapy,201 relying on the same sources the California legislature 
listed in its session laws.202 Citing the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Pickup, the district court held that fundament parental rights do not 
extend to allow parents to seek medical treatment for their children 
that the legislature “has reasonably deemed harmful or 
ineffective.”203 Much like the Ninth Circuit, the district court granted 
deference to the determination made by the legislature as to the well-
being of children and the merits of conversion therapy generally.204
The court cited cases from other circuits holding that, in general, 
adult patients do not have a constitutional right to obtain a particular 
type of medical treatment or to be treated by a specific health care 
provider.205 Because adults do not have expansive constitutional 
rights to medical care of their choosing, the court stated that finding 
an unlimited parental right to choose health care for children would 
be inconsistent with the decisions concerning adults.206 Thus, while 
parents do retain the fundamental right to make decisions regarding 
the “care, custody, and control of their children,”207 the state can 
nevertheless prevent parents from choosing medical treatments it has 
                                                     
199. See id. (“[T]o recognize the right Plaintiffs assert would be to compel 
the California legislature, in shaping its regulation of mental health providers, to 
accept Plaintiffs’ personal views of what therapy is safe and effective for minors.”).
200. See 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569-71 (listing official statements condemning 
conversion therapy from the American Psychiatric Association, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, the American School Counselor Association, the National 
Association of Social Workers, the American Medical Association Council on 
Scientific Affairs, and the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, 
among others). 
201. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2013). 
202. Compare Cal. Stat. 6569-71, with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (relying on 
the same sources finding that conversion therapy is ultimately harmful to children); 
Lisa Leff, California’s ‘Ex-Gay’ Reparative Therapy Ban Details Sought, Shared in 
Other States, HUFFPOST QUEER VOICES (Oct. 2, 2012, 1:51 PM), http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/02/california-ex-gay-reparative-therapy-ban-information- 
shared_n_1933025.html. 
203. Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 518, 530 (D.N.J. 2014). 
204. See id. 
205. See id. at 529-30. (citing Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of 
Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2000); 
Mitchell v. Clayton, 995 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 1993)). 
206. See id. at 529-30. 
207. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
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found to be contrary to the children’s best interests.208 The New 
Jersey and the California cases indicate that states can 
constitutionally outlaw care they find unreasonably harmful based on 
existing research and professional opinions, even if a portion of the 
professionals in the field do support the form of care.209
C. Tension Between the Parent and the State 
Because the state has broad police power to legislate and 
protect the well-being of its citizens, states have been able to use 
parens patriae standing in the past to intervene when parents denied 
consent to medical treatment for their children.210 Even though courts 
are generally reluctant to interfere with the parental right to raise 
children as the parent sees fit, courts have carved out an exception to 
this deference in cases in which parents refuse to consent to life-
saving treatment for their child.211 In many cases, the parents refuse 
treatment based on their religious beliefs, and the courts must weigh 
the parents’ First Amendment right to freedom of religion and family 
autonomy with the child’s interest in obtaining the life-saving 
treatment.212 Courts may also weigh the burden of the procedure on 
the child with the probability of the procedure’s success to determine 
whether to intervene and order the medical treatment.213
In People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that a child could be placed in the custody of a guardian 
when the child’s parent refused to consent to a life-saving blood 
transfusion on religious grounds.214 The parents, who were Jehovah’s 
Witnesses, refused to consent to a blood transfusion for their 
daughter despite doctors’ advice that she would either die or become 
severely mentally disabled without the transfusion.215 The court held 
                                                     
208. See 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569-72; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:1-55 (West 2013). 
209. See Doe, 33 F. Supp. 3d at 530; Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1236 
(9th Cir. 2014). 
210. See infra Section II.C. 
211. SAMUEL M. DAVIS, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 75 (2011); 
Nobel, supra note 153, at 654 (noting a general trend to overrule religious objections 
to medical treatment when a court believes treatment is in the best interest of the 
minor). 
212. Id. at 639-40. 
213. Id. at 636-37, 639 (citing In re Phillip B. v. Warren B., 156 Cal. Rptr. 
48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); Newmark v. Williams, 588 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Del. 
1991)). 
214. 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ill. 1952). 
215. Id. 
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that the state was permitted to exercise its power as parens patriae216
to remove the child from the custody of her parents because the child 
was considered neglected.217 The court stated that the refusal to 
consent to the blood transfusion was sufficient evidence to show that 
the child had been neglected even though the parents were acting in 
accordance with their religious beliefs because the parents’ actions 
would almost certainly result in the child’s death.218 Even though the 
parents’ religious beliefs were sincere, the strength of their beliefs 
was insufficient to outweigh the state’s valid interest in the safety 
and well-being of its minor citizens.219
Similarly, the state was permitted to intervene in In re 
Willmann when a minor’s parents refused to consent to surgery to 
have a malignant tumor removed from their son’s arm.220 After the 
son underwent chemotherapy that reduced the size of the tumor, the 
father informed physicians that he had faith that his son had been 
healed and would not consent to surgery to remove the tumor.221
Once again, the parent’s religious beliefs were sincere, but those 
beliefs nonetheless endangered the life of a child that the state had a 
valid interest in protecting.222 In language similar to that invoked in 
Prince,223 the court held that the parents’ decision to deny their son 
treatment was not protected under the Constitution because the 
decision was not in the child’s best interest.224 The state was 
                                                     
216. See supra Section III.B.  
217. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d at 773. 
218. Id. (“[I]t is of no consequence that the parents have not failed in their 
duty in other respects. We entertain no doubt that this child, whose parents were 
deliberately depriving it of life or subjecting it to permanent mental impairment, was 
a neglected child within the meaning of the statute.”); see also Niebla ex rel. Niebla 
v. Cty. of San Diego, No. 90-56302, 1992 WL 140250, at *4 (9th Cir. June 23, 
1992) (holding that a trial court’s order compelling blood transfusion for a child of 
two Jehovah’s Witnesses was valid because the state has a compelling interest in 
protecting the health of its children). 
219. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d at 773. 
220. 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
221. Id. at 1384. 
222. See id. 
223. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). 
224. Id. at 1389-90 (“[The Willmanns] may, under the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the state of Ohio, be free to deny themselves 
whatever medical care they choose, but it does not, and cannot here, follow that they 
are free to impose that denial upon [their child].”); see also In re D.L.E., 645 P.2d 
271, 275 (Colo. 1982) (holding that the state could consider the son “dependent” and 
remove him from the home or assign a nurse to ensure that he complied with court-
ordered treatment). In In re D.L.E., the state intervened when a mother refused 
medical treatment for her epileptic son, choosing instead to rely on prayer and faith 
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empowered to intervene in the parents’ decision because the child’s
welfare was at stake—regardless of parental rights to medical 
decision-making for children, the state was not required to stand idly 
by while the life of a minor was at risk.225
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Nixon,
also upheld the use of parens patriae for imposing criminal sanctions 
on parents for failure to fulfill a legal duty to care for a child.226 In 
Nixon, two parents were convicted of involuntary manslaughter and 
endangering the welfare of children after they chose to treat their 
daughter’s sickness by “anointing” her in the church.227 The daughter 
fell into a coma and later died of diabetes acidosis; her death could 
have been prevented if her parents had taken her to the hospital 
rather than relying entirely on spiritual care.228 Citing Prince,229 the 
court stated that the state was well within its right to act as parens 
patriae when it passed legislation creating an affirmative duty for 
parents to care for their children and make reasonable medical 
decisions to protect their children.230 Thus, not only could the state 
intervene to prevent harm to the child, as seen in Labrenz231 and 
Willmann,232 but the state could also impose sanctions after the fact to 
punish parents who did not adequately protect their child’s best 
interests.233
However, courts will not intervene in all cases in which the 
child’s life is at stake; in In re Hofbauer v. Hofbauer, the court 
refused to allow the state to intervene on behalf of a terminally ill 
child because the parents’ preferred course of treatment had been 
recommended by a licensed physician.234 After the child was 
diagnosed with Hodgkin’s disease, doctors in New York 
recommended that the child undergo radiation or chemotherapy.235
The parents chose instead to take their son to a clinic that would treat 
                                                                                                               
healing. Id. at 272. The son then refused to comply with treatment and continue 
medication to manage his condition, and the court held that the child was dependent 
and neglected. Id. at 276. 
225. In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d at 1390.
226. 761 A.2d 1151, 1153 (Pa. 2000). 
227. Id. at 1152. 
228. Id. 
229. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). 
230. Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1153. 
231. 104 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ill. 1952). 
232. In re Willmann, 493 N.E.2d 1380, 1383 (Ohio Ct. App. 1986). 
233. Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1153. 
234. 393 N.E.2d 1009, 1011 (N.Y. 1979). 
235. Id.  
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him with nutritional and metabolic therapy.236 The court held that the 
parents had not neglected their son because the treatment they chose 
had been recommended by a licensed physician, even though the 
course of treatment was not the most widely accepted in the medical 
community.237 Thus, the court gave higher deference to the physician 
than to the state in deciding the case, even though the physician who 
had provided the treatment was in a very small minority of doctors 
who would not have recommended the radiation or chemotherapy.238
The court stressed that complicated medical decisions rarely have 
truly “right” or “wrong” answers.239 Given the inherent uncertainty to 
these complex medical decisions, the state could not simply 
substitute the parents’ judgment for the decision the court felt was 
more prudent.240
Further, not all courts have required that the child’s life be in 
danger before the state can protect the child’s best interests.241 In In 
re Sampson v. Taylor, a New York appeals court ordered that a child 
with a congenital disease that resulted in an overgrowth of tissue on 
one side of his face undergo corrective surgery.242 The child’s mother 
was a Jehovah’s Witness who was religiously opposed to the blood 
transfusions necessary during the procedure, although she did not 
otherwise object to having the growth surgically removed.243 While 
the condition was not fatal, the court stated that the state was 
justified in intervening to order the surgery, as the procedure was 
necessary for the child to have “anything resembling a normal 
                                                     
236. Id. The son was originally diagnosed in the family’s home state of New 
York, but the family flew to a clinic in Jamaica for this alternative treatment. Id. The 
suit for neglect was brought against the family after they returned to New York a 
month later. Id. 
237. Id. at 1014 (“[T]he court’s inquiry should be whether the parents . . . 
have provided for their child a treatment which is recommended by their physician 
and which has not been totally rejected by all responsible medical authority.”); see 
also In re Matthews, 650 N.Y.S.2d 373, 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (holding that a 
parental decision to refuse a feeding tube for their son was reasonable because it was 
based on the opinion of a licensed medical professional and did not deprive him of 
life-sustaining treatment). 
238. See In re Hofbauer v. Hofbauer, 393 N.E.2d at 1014. 
239. Id.
240. Id. (“Nor can a court assume the role of a surrogate parent and establish 
as the objective criteria with which to evaluate a parent’s decision its own judgment 
as to the exact method or degree of medical treatment which should be provided 
. . . .”).
241. In re Sampson v. Taylor, 323 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). 
242. Id. at 254-55. 
243. Id. at 255. 
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life.”244 The court also noted that the operation could not “be 
performed without substantial risk,” but stated that the child had 
already been unable to attend school and could not lead a productive 
life without the surgery.245 In this case, the court placed great 
importance on the fact that the child’s doctors had recommended 
surgery, even though the child’s mother disagreed.246 Further, quality
of life, not the mere maintenance of life, was used to justify the 
surgery even though it was not strictly necessary to save the child’s
life.247
Thus, while parents do retain the right to the “care, custody, 
and control”248 of their children, this right is not inviolable.249 The 
state, acting as parens patriae, can curtail parental rights in those 
limited circumstances in which state intervention is found to be 
within the child’s best interest.250 Generally, when parents choose to 
refuse treatment for religious reasons to the detriment of their child, 
courts will allow the state to intervene to provide the child with life-
saving treatment.251 In determining whether to allow the state to 
intervene in the family decision, courts engage in a careful balancing 
process, taking into consideration the seriousness of the child’s 
medical condition; consequences of treatment, including possible 
risks; and the maturity of the child.252 However, the crux of the 
analysis revolves around the best interests of the child, which, 
particularly in the medical context, can be viewed through the lens of 
the substantive due process right to privacy.253
IV. CHOOSING GENDER: THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVACY 
AND INFORMED CONSENT
While it is often safe to assume that parents will act in their 
child’s best interest when making medical decisions, this 
presumption should not extend to cases in which the child’s long 
term fundamental rights, such as the substantive due process right to 
                                                     
244. Id.
245. Id. 
246. See id. 
247. See id.
248. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
249. See, e.g., Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1235 (9th Cir. 2014). 
250. See, e.g., id.; Doe v. Christie, 33 F. Supp. 3d 518, 530 (D.N.J. 2014). 
251. See Nobel, supra note 153, at 640.  
252. Id. at 636. 
253. See Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1235; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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privacy, are implicated.254 Genital surgery in infancy implicates the 
child’s substantive due process right to privacy by depriving the 
child of the opportunity to define his or her gender, an aspect of 
identity that will shape the child’s growth and have a continuing 
impact throughout the child’s life.255 Surgery often serves more of a 
social than a medical purpose, allowing doctors, parents, and society 
to avoid the discomfort of conceptualizing gender outside of the 
strict gender binary.256 In order to protect the child’s well-being, the 
states should intervene as parens patriae to prevent genital 
assignment surgery until the child is old enough to meaningfully 
participate in the decision.257 As recommended by ISNA, states 
should require that hospitals have available at least one social worker 
who has training and education regarding intersex conditions.258 The 
social worker would provide counseling and advice to the parents of 
a child born with an intersex condition.259 If necessary to resolve 
disputes, the case can be referred to a hospital ethics board or 
administrative judge to determine whether genital assignment 
surgery is in the child’s best interest.260 These social workers could 
rely in part on the 2006 Consensus Statement and advocate for 
families to refrain from surgery until the child is, at minimum, old 
enough to understand the procedure.261 States have the right to 
intervene as parens patriae in these cases not only because the 
surgeries affect the child’s health and well-being,262 but also because 
the surgeries have strong implications for the child’s fundamental 
right to privacy. Further, requiring consultation with a professional, 
and possibly a neutral decisionmaker, states would be intruding only 
                                                     
254. See Bishop, supra note 148; Curtis, supra note 148. 
255. See Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 752-53; Beh & Diamond, supra note 
49, at 2 (describing interviews with two men who had been assigned female at birth 
and spent their teen and young adult lives reconstructing their sex through surgery 
and assuming male gender identities). 
256. KESSLER, supra note 9, at 31 (“The belief that gender consists of two 
exclusive types is maintained and perpetuated by the medical community in the face 
of incontrovertible physical evidence that this is not mandated by biology.”). 
257. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 
600 (1982) (defining state’s rights as parens pariae).
258. See DREGER, supra note 14 (outlining ISNA’s proposed treatment 
model for intersex case management). 
259. See id.
260. See id.
261. See Lee et al., supra note 15. 
262. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607. 
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minimally on the parent’s right to make medical decisions on behalf 
of the child.263
A. Long-Term Consequences of Genital Assignment Surgery 
The parental right to make decisions about childrearing has 
remained sacrosanct throughout the years, and it is too deeply 
embedded in constitutional jurisprudence to be displaced.264
However, state intervention to ensure that children are protected 
from unwanted genital surgeries would not result in the legislature 
usurping the parents’ power to make choices about the care and well-
being of their child.265 In protecting parental rights, the Court has 
continued to cite Meyer v. Nebraska266 and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters267 for the proposition that parents have a fundamental right to 
make decisions regarding their children.268 The opinions in both 
Meyer and Pierce contained strong language affirming parental 
rights in childrearing, emphasizing the importance of preventing the 
state from interfering in the private family realm.269 However, 
choosing to have a child learn a foreign language before the eighth 
grade or attend parochial school rather than public school, as was at 
issue in those cases, is fundamentally different from choosing the 
child’s sex.270 The parental decisions at stake in Meyer and Pierce
affected the children for a finite amount of time, after which the 
children would be free to continue their education as they saw fit.271
In contrast, genital assignment surgery has long-term health 
consequences for the child,272 and many children who were operated 
on at birth report serious negative psychological outcomes from 
                                                     
263. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 589-91 (1979) (describing 
administrative decision-making process for involuntary mental institutionalization 
that balances parental rights against state wishes); see also supra Section III.A. 
264. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality 
opinion).  
265. Ryan & Sampen, supra note 150. 
266. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
267. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
268. E.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 66. 
269. See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (“[T]he Legislature has attempted 
materially to interfere . . . with the power of parents to control the education of their 
own.”); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The child is not the mere creature of the state; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high 
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.”).
270. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35. 
271. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535. 
272. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
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having their condition hidden from them throughout their lives.273
David Reimer, the young boy who John Money used to try and prove 
that gender could be determined through childrearing and 
socialization, serves as just one example.274 Thus, while the Court’s 
earlier childrearing decisions focused on cultural and educational 
choices, consenting to genital reconstruction surgery is 
fundamentally different in that the parents’ decision will continue to 
impact the child profoundly throughout the child’s entire life.275
While parents might believe that a single surgery in infancy 
will “fix” their child, in reality, many of the surgeries performed in 
infancy require even further surgery as the child develops.276 Simply, 
it is difficult, if not impossible, to construct genitals on a one-year-
old child that will look and function well when the child begins 
puberty and again when the child enters adulthood.277 Another 
consequence that most parents may not consider when consenting to 
genital surgery on the infant is that the surgery can reduce sensation 
in the genitals; in fact, adults who reported having the surgery in 
infancy are more likely than the general population to experience 
anorgasmia.278 Because of the severe and drastic possible 
consequences of genital assignment surgery in infancy, the decision 
to have a child undergo the surgery implicates far more of the child’s 
rights than the decisions at issue in Meyer279 and Pierce.280 When it 
comes to genital assignment surgery, parents are not simply 
“direct[ing] the upbringing and education of children under their 
                                                     
273. Beh & Diamond, supra note 49, at 2; KESSLER, supra note 9, at 1-4; 
Bishop, supra note 148, at 541; Alyssa Connell Lareau, Note, Who Decides? 
Genital-Normalizing Surgery on Intersexed Infants, 92 GEO. L.J. 129, 133-34
(2003).  
274. See supra Section I.B. While he was not born with an intersex 
condition, David Reimer’s assignment surgery under the direction of John Money is 
perhaps the most vivid example of the possible long-term consequences of genital 
surgery in infancy and the concealment-centered treatment model. See supra Section 
I.B. 
275. See Beh & Diamond, supra note 49, at 2. 
276. Alizai et al., supra note 38, at 1590; Creighton, Minto & Steele, supra
note 68, at 125.
277. See Alizai et al., supra note 38 (discussing the physical complications 
that arise throughout life for children who were assigned female at birth and needed 
further surgery in adolescence). 
278. Minto et al., supra note 68, at 1256. “Anorgasmia” is the inability to 
achieve orgasm. Cindy M. Meston et al., Disorders of Orgasm in Women, 1 J.
SEXUAL MED. 66, 67 (2004).  
279. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923).  
280. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). 
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control.”281 Rather, they are making a virtually irreversible decision 
that will impact the child every day for the rest of his or her life and 
will play a central role in shaping the child’s identity.282 Genital 
assignment surgery is not simply a parenting decision, and removing 
the decision from the sole discretion of the parents promotes the 
child’s right to future self-determination as described within the 
Court’s privacy jurisprudence.283 The state is well within its rights to 
intervene in a limited way to ensure that these surgeries, at the very 
least, are well-considered and subject to neutral determination before 
the child’s life is irreversibly altered.284
B. Successful Mediation Between the Parent and the State 
Parham v. J.R. illustrates a statutory framework under which 
the state can, acting as parens patriae, create procedures in hospitals 
to prevent uninformed, cosmetic genital surgeries on infants by 
requiring the decision to be independently approved by a 
professional trained to act in the child’s best interests.285 In Parham,
parents had a statutory right to have their children involuntarily 
institutionalized if the parents could not treat or care for a child with 
a mental illness.286 However, the statute required hospital staff to 
develop procedures to evaluate each child after the parent had the 
child committed, thus ensuring that children were not needlessly 
institutionalized.287 After the parent checked the child into the 
hospital, several levels of administration in the facility reviewed the 
decision.288 In one hospital, children were interviewed three times by 
members of the admission team before being received into 
                                                     
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 94, at 753 (defining “personhood” and 
discussing the intersection between privacy and self-determination). 
283. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) 
(plurality opinion) (discussing fundamental questions of identity that the right to 
privacy implicitly protects). 
284. See supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
285. See 442 U.S. 584, 592-93 (1979) (detailing procedural safeguards in 
place under a Georgia statute allowing parents to institutionalize their minor 
children involuntarily). 
286. See id. at 602. 
287. See id. at 591. 
288. Id. at 590-96. While the statute established minimum procedural 
safeguards, each individual facility was free to develop its own procedure that would 
comply with the statute. Id. at 591. 
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treatment.289 In another, each child had to first be evaluated by a 
separate mental-health clinic and recommended to the hospital for 
treatment, after which hospital and clinic staff would consult with 
each other to determine whether the child should be admitted.290
Once the hospitals complied with the most basic guidelines set forth 
in the statute, the different institutions were able to develop 
individual procedures for admission that would best fit the facility.291
Before children could be deprived of their fundamental liberty 
interest under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the 
state took multiple steps to ensure that the decision to institutionalize 
the child was in the child’s best interest.292
While the Parham case provides an illustration of the power
parents hold over their children, it is also a salient example of how 
the state and the parent can exercise their rights in tandem to the 
benefit of the child.293 The children’s rights at stake in Parham were 
protected as a matter of procedural due process,294 but when the right 
at issue concerns traits as personal and fundamental as sex, gender, 
and bodily integrity, the state would be justified in intervening on the 
basis of the substantive due process right to privacy.295 The Court has 
a history of allowing the state to intervene on substantive grounds to 
both establish and protect substantive due process rights.296 Like the 
procedural requirements for commitment in Parham, state 
legislatures must develop minimum requirements for hospitals to 
meet when informing new parents of their child’s intersex condition 
and discussing the ongoing course of treatment.297 Such a law would 
effectively do away with the concealment-based method of intersex 
case management,298 instead allowing parents to understand their 
                                                     
289. Id. at 590. The statute in question also allowed for the child who had 
spent at least five days in the institution to be discharged upon request of a parent or 
guardian. Id. at 591. 
290. Id. at 592. 
291. Id. at 591. 
292. See id. at 590-96. 
293. See id. at 604 (“Parents in Georgia in no sense have an absolute right to 
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superintendent of each regional hospital to exercise independent judgment as to the 
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294. Id. at 600; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
295. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) 
(establishing a substantive due process right to privacy). 
296. See supra Part III. 
297. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 531 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
298. See GERMON, supra note 28, at 36; see also supra Section I.B. 
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child’s medical condition and avoid any adverse psychological 
impact that the concealment-based model has traditionally caused.299
Throughout the Parham opinion, the Court emphasized that a 
parent’s right to have a child involuntarily committed was in part 
predicated on the fact that the parent was the best judge of whether 
the medical decision was in the child’s best interest.300 However, 
evidence suggests that this justification does not hold true in the 
context of genital surgery for children with intersex conditions.301
Physicians report that they believe surgery is necessary for the parent 
to be able to bond with their child,302 and the American Pediatric 
Association’s perspective on intersex treatment tends to support this 
view by referring to intersex conditions as “social emergencies” 
rather than medical ones.303 Regardless, parental discomfort with a 
child’s intersex condition should not be sufficient to support the 
decision to consent to life-altering sex assignment surgery,304
particularly given the medical problem commonly arising from these 
surgeries305 and the growing movement to change the standard of 
care for children born with intersex conditions.306 Creating additional 
statutory procedures to keep parents well-informed about intersex 
conditions would serve as the same type of check the hospital 
administrators performed on parental decisions in Parham.307 A third 
party could also provide a more objective view of the child and the 
duties the parent will undertake to raise the child without framing the 
                                                     
299. KESSLER, supra note 9, at 32. 
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2134 Michigan State Law Review  2015:2095 
discussion in the more clinical terms parents would expect to hear 
from a doctor.308 In its proposed treatment method for children born 
with intersex conditions, ISNA suggests that parents be given the 
opportunity to speak directly with adults who were born with 
intersex conditions.309 Meeting with adults with intersex conditions 
would allow parents to hear a first-hand perspective regarding the 
benefits and harms of postponing surgery.310 Even the change in tone, 
from that of a doctor to that of a social worker, could put new parents 
more at ease.311
As seen in cases involving a parent’s religious objection to life-
saving medical treatment for a child, many hospitals already have 
counselors and social workers on staff to ensure that children receive 
necessary medical care notwithstanding parental objections.312 One 
illustrative example is People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, in which a 
hospital assigned a child to a legal guardian after her parents refused 
to consent to a life-saving blood transfusion.313 Refusing to allow the 
child to receive treatment was tantamount to neglect, and the state 
was justified in acting as parens patriae to remove the child from her 
parent’s custody and have her undergo the blood transfusion.314 The 
parents’ fundamental right to make decisions regarding the “care, 
custody, and control”315 of their child could not outweigh the value of 
the child’s life and the state’s interest in protecting it.316 So too is the 
rationale with genital reconstruction surgeries for children born with 
intersex conditions: Gender will affect a child’s day-to-day 
interactions and activities for the child’s entire life, and it does not 
serve the child’s interest for parents to consent to surgery without the 
child granting any form of meaningful consent.317 Compared to the 
Court’s history in developing privacy law, invasive genital surgeries 
implicate the same concerns regarding self-determination and 
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316. See Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d at 773. 
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personhood as the decisions in Roe,318 Bellotti,319 and Carey.320 Just as 
privacy rights were at issue in those and other cases, particularly for 
minors, so too is the right to privacy implicated when a child is 
deprived of the right to choose to undergo an invasive surgery that 
will impact the entirety of the child’s life.321
While the medical consequences of the parents’ actions in 
People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz were more drastic than those 
presented in the average intersex case management scenario, the 
state was nonetheless acting as parens patriae to prevent parents 
from making irreversible decisions that would fundamentally impact 
the child’s entire life without the child’s consent.322 Further, at least 
one court has allowed the state to authorize a medical procedure over 
the parents’ objection even though the child’s illness, an outgrowth 
of facial tissue, was not fatal.323 The New York Appellate Division in 
In re Sampson found that the state could intervene and order a 
nonfatal medical procedure for a child against the parents’ wishes.324
In placing a strong emphasis on allowing the child to live a “normal 
life,” the court’s decision illustrates that the state may serve a child’s 
best interests by intervening to protect the child’s external identity.325
Indeed, the value of living a life without a debilitating condition is 
much the same as the value of living a life free from multiple 
invasive surgeries over a long period of time.326
An individual’s identity and sense of self is as much 
intertwined with personal conception of gender and sex as it is with 
the outward appearance the person presents to the world.327 Gender 
plays a fundamental role in how children socialize; interact in the 
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Div. 1971). 
324. See id. (ordering that a tissue overgrowth be surgically removed from 
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325. See id. at 255. 
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world; and are viewed by friends, family, and future colleagues.328
For better or worse, the gender binary has a strong influence on daily 
life.329 Children who are erroneously assigned gender at birth must 
then navigate the complex waters of gender expression or 
reassignment later in life, and much of the associated confusion 
could be avoided by simply postponing surgery until the child has 
formed a more complete gender identity and sense of self.330 State 
intervention in cases such as Labrenz and In re Sampson indicate that 
parents do not always have sole discretion to make life-altering 
medical decisions for their children,331 and this principle should 
extend to genital assignment surgery for intersex case management. 
The California and New Jersey laws332 prohibiting conversion 
therapy for children under the age of eighteen serve as another 
example of the state acting as parens patriae to protect the child’s
right to self-determination.333 These statutes are relevant to the 
analysis of intersex case management not only because they limit a 
parent’s right to make treatment decisions for a child,334 but also 
because conversion therapy involves another central aspect of an 
individual’s identity: sexual orientation.335 State intervention in these 
cases indicates that not only does the state have a right to intervene 
as parens patriae to protect a child’s physical well-being, but also to 
protect the child from the psychological harm that comes from 
attempting to alter a fundamental part of identity.336 In the case of 
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Clarity, 6 REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS 144, 145 (1998). 
336. See 2012 Cal. Stat. 6569-71 (citing research from numerous 
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genital assignment surgery, both the child’s physical and 
psychological well-being are put at risk when the child is operated 
on, without consent, at birth.337
Conversion therapy, much like cosmetic genital surgery, is an 
elective process, often initiated by the minor’s parent, that is not 
necessary to the child’s survival but allows the parent and society at 
large to place the child within comfortable societal bounds.338 In 
reviewing the California ban on conversion therapy, the Ninth 
Circuit held that the state did not violate fundamental parental rights 
by prohibiting parents from placing their children in therapy that 
ultimately does more harm than good.339 Based on the numerous 
studies detailing the long-term physical and psychological effects of 
infant genital surgery,340 states could reasonably determine that these 
surgeries are more likely to harm, rather than help, the child.341 In 
making the reasonable determination based on the available 
evidence, states would be well within their power to act as parens 
patriae by imposing administrative restraints and restricting genital 
surgeries to only those situations in which they are medically 
necessary.342
C. Privacy As an Existing Basis for Intersex Rights 
The substantive due process right to privacy is an amorphous, 
“penumbral” right that has not been clearly defined by the Court.343
However, the Court has stated that implicit in the right to privacy are 
several fundamental aspects of identity and self-determination that 
cannot be abridged by the state.344 One clear trend that has arisen in 
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privacy cases is the focus on intimacy, forming a family, and 
procreating as among the parts of human life and identity that are so 
central to human identity as to be inviolate.345 As seen in Carey v. 
Population Services International346 and Bellotti v. Baird,347 these 
rights are extended to minors. 
The Court’s privacy jurisprudence, particularly as it pertains to 
minors through abortion and contraceptive rights, further emphasizes 
self-determination as central to the substantive due process right to 
privacy.348 In Bellotti v. Baird, the Court reasoned that the
consequences of having a child, particularly at a young age, coupled 
with the time-sensitive nature of choosing to terminate a pregnancy, 
made it necessary for states to allow minors to go through a judicial 
bypass procedure to obtain an abortion without notifying a parent.349
The Court noted that a pregnant minor usually cannot avoid 
confrontation with her parents by waiting until she reached the age of 
majority before obtaining an abortion.350 The gravity of the decision 
could result in the minor not feeling ready or able to speak to a 
parent about the decision, and in those cases, the minor would often 
benefit more from terminating the pregnancy than from carrying the 
child to term.351 The underage abortion cases illustrate the 
fundamental importance of self-determination when making medical 
decisions that will affect an individual’s entire life;352 even minors 
should be granted deference in making decisions that will impact the 
minor’s life for decades to come.353
Supporters of the surgical model for intersex case management 
would argue, rightly, that there is a significant difference between a 
pregnant teenager and a newborn infant in terms of competence to 
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make complex medical decisions.354 While this is true, the distinction 
misses the mark. The Court emphasized in Bellotti that minors must 
have some avenue to bypass parental consent because if the child had 
legitimate concerns about her parents learning of the pregnancy, she 
did not have the option of waiting until adulthood to obtain the 
abortion.355 In this context, the self-determination concerns that 
undergird the privacy doctrine become relevant at a much faster 
pace.356 A pregnant minor only has a few months to decide whether 
to assume the identity of a mother, as well as the responsibilities that 
accompany that identity.357
Genital surgery for intersex children differs from the decision 
to terminate a pregnancy in that, in most cases, whether to undergo 
the surgery is not a time-sensitive issue.358 However, just as 
becoming a parent has “grave and indelible” consequences for a 
minor,359 so too does irreversible cosmetic surgery undergone before 
the child has had the opportunity to explore his or her gender 
identity.360 The decision in Baird evinces a larger principle that some 
minors are mature enough to make life-altering decisions about their 
sexuality and reproductive health.361 Intersex case management, in 
most cases, is not under the same time pressure that the Court 
identified in Baird, which is all the more reason to cease infant 
genital surgeries until such time as the child can meaningfully 
participate in the decision.362 Genital assignment surgeries implicate 
the same privacy rights and concerns as abortion, but the time aspect 
simply works in reverse: Rather than it being important to resolve the 
issue quickly, it is important to wait to undergo surgery until the 
child is old enough to give informed consent.363
Finally, setting aside the practicalities of postponing surgeries 
that are purely cosmetic, the effect of gender on identity and self-
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determination cannot be understated.364 Every person navigates 
through the world and interacts with others within a larger cultural 
milieu that places heavy emphasis on the gender binary and the 
behaviors associated with each pole.365 Gender is implicated to some 
degree in the “personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education” that 
Justice O’Connor identified as inherently protected under the 
constitutional right to privacy.366 It would be anomalous to argue that
a personal characteristic underlying nearly every aspect of individual 
life does not deserve the same protections afforded to decisions such 
as whether to procreate.367 For this reason, the state would be well 
within its rights to intervene as parens patriae to protect children 
born with intersex conditions from having their gender decided for 
them, without their consent, and before they can even understand 
what they are losing. Mandated social workers and the possibility of 
referral to a neutral decisionmaker in cases of disagreement are very 
minor procedural protections and obstacles when compared to the 
interests at stake for the child born with an intersex condition. 
CONCLUSION
As an area of law that has not been well addressed by 
American courts, intersex case management presents unique 
questions about privacy, self-definition, and the interplay of parental 
and state interests in protecting the health and safety of children.368
Intersex activists recognize the harm that could result from raising 
children with intersex conditions to view themselves as “outside” of 
societal norms.369 However, gender does not have to correspond with 
physical sex, particularly when an intersex individual can simply 
choose to undergo surgery later in life, rather than risk the 
complications of surgery in infancy.370 For this reason, the state, 
exercising its power as parens patriae, can prevent parents from 
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making the decision on behalf of their children because surgical 
assignment at birth is ultimately more harmful to the child than
helpful.371 By imposing two simple procedural requirements 
preceding all intersex genital reconstruction surgeries, consultation 
with a social worker and possible review by a neutral decisionmaker, 
the state would protect the rights of many children while imposing 
minimal burden on hospitals and parents. 
While there are likely many legal avenues through which 
intersex activists could attempt to reform the current method of 
treating intersex conditions through genital surgery in infancy, 
allowing the state to invoke parens patriae to prevent medically 
unnecessary surgeries can, if used effectively, mediate the tensions 
between state and parental power.372 The state has a particular 
interest in actively taking steps to protect intersex children from 
these surgeries, given the many implications gender carries for the 
substantive due process right to privacy.373 Ultimately, social workers 
or other state officials can combat the stigma associated with intersex 
conditions through educating medical professionals and parents 
about the conditions and the possible long-term consequences of 
early surgical intervention.374 Neutral decisionmakers would assure 
that the parents’ concerns are heard and considered before any 
surgery is performed, while also ensuring that everyone involved in 
the process is informed about the consequences of intersex genital 
reconstruction surgeries.375 Until then, children born with intersex 
conditions will continue to suffer as a result of misinformation and 
fundamental misunderstanding of gender, sex, and the gender binary 
in the medical community and society at large. 
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